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Forresterv. White: Personal Consequences of

Personnel Decisions: Extending Judicial
Immunity to Employment Discrimination
by Judges
In 1979, Judge White of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of the
State of Illinois fired his probation officer, Cynthia Forrester,
citing scheduling disputes and conflicts between Forrester and
her coworker.1 Forrester then filed an action against Judge
White in federal district court under civil rights statute 42
U.S.C. § 1983,2 alleging that Judge White had discharged her
because of her sex.3 A jury found Judge White liable and
awarded Forrester compensatory damages.4 Judge White's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied, but
his motion for a new trial was granted. 5 On retrial, the district
court granted summary judgment for Judge White, stating that
he was absolutely immune from a civil damages award. 6 Forrester appealed. In Forrester v. White,7 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the district
court's ruling, holding that Judge White was immune from liaa judicial act
bility because Forrester's dismissal constituted
8
within the scope of the judge's authority.
This Comment examines the Seventh Circuit's decision to
1. Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 648, 650 (7th Cir.), cert granted, 107
S. Ct. 1282 (1986).
2. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides a federal right of action against
state officials for violation of any person's federal constitutional or statutory
rights. The statute states:
Every person who, under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C § 1983 (1982).
3. Forrester,792 F.2d at 650.
4. Id. The jury awarded Forrester approximately $82,000 in compensatory damages. Id.
5. Id. at 650.
6. Id.
7. 792 F.2d 647 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1282 (1986).
8. Id. at 658.
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apply the doctrine of judicial immunity to personnel decisions.
Part I discusses the history of judicial immunity, its policies and
justifications, and the present state of the law concerning judicial immunity for personnel decisions at the district court level.
Part II examines the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Forrester.
Part III then argues that the Forrestercourt misapplied the judicial immunity doctrine in this case. Finally, the Comment
concludes that the holding in Forresterunjustifiably denies certain judicial employees the right to bring private damages actions against their employers and leaves judges without clear
guidelines to govern their future employment practices.
I.

THE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

The doctrine of judicial immunity had its American beginnings in the Supreme Court case of Bradley v. Fisher.9 In Brad-

ley, the Court held that judges are absolutely immune from
liability'0 for acts that are judicial in nature 1 and that fall
within, or even are in excess of, their jurisdiction. 2 Only when
9. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). In this case, the attorney for John
Suratt, an alleged conspirator in President Lincoln's assassination, sought

damages from a judge who, the attorney alleged, had wrongfully disbarred him
after a hung jury verdict. Id. at 344-45. The Court denied relief for the attorney, holding the judge to be immune from a civil suit resulting from a judicial
act. Id. at 354.
For scholarly discussions tracing the history of judicial immunity from
English common law through its development in the United States, see Block,
Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L.J.
879, 881-920, and Feinman & Cohen, Suing Judges. History and Theory, 31
S.C.L. REV. 201, 202-56 (1980). See also Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 530-36
(1984) (using English common-law traditions to find a magistrate personally liable for attorney's fees award).
10. Absolute immunity is one of two forms of official immunity that have
been recognized by the Supreme Court. Absolute immunity is an affirmative
defense providing complete protection from suit and has been recognized for
legislators, see Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501
(1975), judges, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978), and certain executive officials, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978). Qualified or
"good faith" immunity is a lesser form of immunity that has been recognized
for public officials performing less discretionary functions. See, e.g., Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). Although officials enjoying absolute immunity are absolutely protected from suit, under the qualified immunity doctrine, officials are protected from suit only to the extent their conduct did not
violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights, of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 818. For a discussion of qualified official
immunity, see Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald. The Lower Courts Implement
the New Standardfor Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 901 (1984).
11. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347.
12. Id. at 351. Although judges remain immune from liability for dam-
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a judge has acted in "clear absence of all jurisdiction" may a
judge be held liable.13 Therefore, under Bradley, the extension
of judicial immunity depends on whether the dual requirements of a "judicial act" performed within a judge's "jurisdiction" are met. 14
The Bradley Court based its rule of absolute immunity on
the concern that without immunity judges would be vulnerable
to vexatious suits brought by disgruntled litigants.' 5 The Court
ages, they may be subject to injunctive or declaratory relief. See Pulliam, 466

U.S. at 536-43. Judges also are not immune from criminal prosecution for civil
rights violations. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) ("the
judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach 'so far as to
immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress.... ."' (quoting
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972))).
13. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351. The Bradley Court distinguished
clear absence of jurisdiction from excess of jurisdiction. Clear absence meant
that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, whereas excess of
jurisdiction referred to the manner in which subject matter jurisdiction was
exercised. Id, at 351-52. Thus, for example, a probate court of limited jurisdiction acts in clear absence of jurisdiction when it presumes to try parties for
public offenses because that would be a usurpation of authority. 1d. at 352. A
criminal court, however, acts only in excess of jurisdiction when it gives a
more severe sentence than that authorized by law. Id. Some commentators
have argued that the jurisdiction element of judicial immunity no longer has
meaning in the modern legal system of courts of general jurisdiction and
should be abolished because it only creates confusion. See Block, supra note 9,
at 921.
14. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.
Four years before Bradley, in Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523
(1868), the Supreme Court held that judges of general jurisdiction were not
civilly liable for judicial acts, even when they acted outside of their jurisdiction. Id. at 536. Justice Field qualified the opinion, however, by adding that
judges may perhaps be liable "where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are
done maliciously or corruptly." Id. In Bradley, however, Justice Field retracted the qualifying remarks, stating that immunity extended even to malicious or corrupt acts. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.
The Bradley rule of judicial immunity remains virtually unchanged to the
present. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (citing the
Bradley holding as the principle continuing to govern the law concerning judicial immunity). The doctrine of judicial immunity from liability for damages,
however, has been altered somewhat by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). The Supreme
Court recently held that the immunity defense does not protect a magistrate
from an award of attorney's fees when prospective injunctive relief is granted
for civil rights violations under § 1988. Pullian, 466 U.S. at 543-44.
15. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 354. The Court reasoned that absolute
immunity was necessary to protect judges and the public interest because
every controversy produces a losing party who could easily allege that the
judge had acted maliciously. Id. at 348. Following this reasoning, the Court
held that judges are immune from liability even for malicious acts, id. at 34849, thus altering an earlier formulation of the doctrine of judicial immunity.
See Randall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 536, discussed supra note 14. According to
commentators Jay Feinman and Roy Cohen, however, the Bradley Court's de-

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

1071

reasoned that such vulnerability would have several negative
results.1 6 According to the Court, the proper administration of
justice depended on the judges' ability to act freely on their
convictions "without the apprehension of personal consequences."1 7 If judges feared reprisal for their actions, the public interests in preserving judicial independence and preventing
the degradation of the judicial office would be impaired.:' In
addition, the Court reasoned that fear of personal liability
would compel judges to keep unnecessarily meticulous records
at trial in case of future litigation.' 9 Finally, the Bradley Court
concluded that lack of judicial immunity would also undermine
the finality of decisions. 20
cision to immunize judges resulted not so much from careful analysis as from
conservative judicial thought that casts judges as "the principal defenders of
an orderly society." See Feinman & Cohen, supra note 9, at 248-49.
In addition to policy considerations, the Bradley Court relied on precedent
to justify its grant of immunity. See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347. Justice Field,
writing for the majority in Bradley, wrote that the doctrine of judicial immunity "has been the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries,
and has never been denied, that we are aware of, in the courts of this country." Id. In their article on the development of judicial immunity, however,
Feinman and Cohen wrote that this statement by Justice Field was made
"with only the usual degree of exaggeration." Feinman & Cohen, supra note
9, at 247. The two authors contend that judicial immunity in England was at
most a limited exception to the general rule of liability and that American
courts have misinterpreted English law. 1d. at 205-20. Contra Block, supra
note 9, at 880 (disagreeing with Feinman and Cohen and contending that limited judicial liability, rather than general liability, was the rule in England).
16. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347-49.
17. Id. at 347.
18. Id. at 349. Discussing the independent decisionmaking rationale behind judicial immunity, the Supreme Court more recently explained:
Judicial immunity arose because it was in the public interest to have
judges who were at liberty to exercise their independent judgment
about the merits of a case without fear of being mulcted for damages
should an unsatisfied litigant be able to convince another tribunal
that the judge acted not only mistakenly but with malice and
corruption.
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31 (1980).
19. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 349.
20. Id The Bradley Court foresaw an endless line of actions, with each
new judge considering the matter becoming a potential defendant. Id
Commentators have suggested policies underlying judicial immunity in addition to those cited in Bradley. See, e.g., Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Offtwers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 271-72 (1937) (suggesting nine reasons
behind absolute judicial immunity: (1) the public's saving from a drain on judicial time by private lawsuits; (2) the judge's freedom to make determinations
without undue influence of the threat of personal liability; (3) the fear that
qualified persons will not seek judgeships; (4) the importance of judicial independence in the federal and state constitutional systems; (5) the need for finality in decisions; (6) the availability of correction on appeal and opportunities
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The Bradley Court also was influenced by the belief that
private actions were not necessary to deter lawless conduct by
judges. 21 The Court stated that a private right of action against
judges is unnecessary because individuals may resort to other
legal remedies, such as correction on appeal, to redress judicial
wrongs. 22 Moreover, the Court noted that judges who perform
may be subject to protheir functions maliciously or corruptly
23
ceedings such as impeachment.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its position on judicial immunity in Butz v. Economou.24 In Butz, the Court
identified the safeguards justifying judicial immunity as including the legal remedy of correction on appeal, the insulation of
judges from political influences, the role of precedent in deciding cases, and the nature of the adversarial process. 25 The
Court in Butz reasoned that because these safeguards serve to
private actions are
deter judges from acting unconstitutionally,
26
not necessary to control judicial conduct.
The Supreme Court also has determined that the doctrine
of judicial immunity is not limited by the Civil Rights Act of
1871 which makes liable "every person" who under color of
state law deprives another person of a civil right.2 7 Notwithstanding the broad language of the statute, the Supreme Court
for change of venue; (7) the absence of a judge's duty to the individual litigant
and the threat of criminal liability or impeachment; (8) the possibility that
judges would not be unfriendly toward their own immunity; and (9) the feeling that judges, whose opinions are required and given deference, should not
be punished due to another judge's opinion).
21. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 354.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
25. Id. at 512.
26. Id. As explained by the Court in Butz:
[Tihe safeguards built into the judicial process tend to reduce the
need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct. The insulation of the judge from political influence,
the importance of precedent in resolving controversies, the adversary
nature of the process, and the correctability of error on appeal are
just a few of the many checks on malicious action by judges. Advocates are restrained not only by their professional obligations, but by
the knowledge that their assertions will be contested by their adversaries in open court ....

Because these features of the judicial process

tend to enhance the reliability of information and the impartiality of
the decisionmaking process, there is a less pressing need for individual suits to correct constitutional error.
Id. (footnote omitted).
27. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983).
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held in Piersonv. Ray 28 that section 1983 does not abrogate the
judge-made defense of judicial immunity. Describing the judicial immunity doctrine as a "settled principle of law," 29 the
Court reasoned that Congress would have specifically abolished
the defense if such a result had been intended by the adoption
of the Act.30 Absent a legislative record clearly indicating such
an intent,3 1 the Court ruled that the common-law immunities
32
still applied.
28. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). In Pierson, the plaintiffs, clergymembers, were
arrested for breaching the peace in a segregated bus terminal during a "prayer
pilgrimage" for racial integration. Id. at 549, 552. The plaintiffs were convicted under a Mississippi statute later held unconstitutional as applied to similar facts by the Supreme Court. Id. at 550. The clergymembers brought suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the arresting officers and the convicting judge,
alleging deprivation of their civil rights. Id at 548, 550. After examining the
legislative record of § 1983 the Court held that the common-law doctrines of
good faith immunity for police officers and absolute immunity for judges were
not abolished by § 1983 and that the convicting judge was, therefore, immune
from liability. See id. at 554-55.
29. Id. at 554. Some commentators contend that the doctrine of judicial
immunity was not universally accepted in 1871 when the Civil Rights Act was
passed. E.g., Feinmam & Cohen, supra note 9, at 237 (contending that both
English and American courts "held many, if not most, judicial officers liable
for their wrongful acts much, if not most, of the time"); Note, Liability of Judicial Officers UnderSection 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 326-27 (1960) (stating that
by 1871, only 13 states had adopted the absolute immunity rule, six states had
held judges liable if they acted maliciously, nine states had faced the issue but
failed to rule clearly, and nine apparently had not faced the issue). Contra
Block, supra note 9, at 899-900 (arguing that judicial immunity was the general
rule in the United States when the Civil Rights Act was passed).
30. Pierson,386 U.S. at 554-55. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Pierson,disagreed. He concluded that "[i]n light of the sharply contested nature of the
issue of judicial immunity it would be reasonable to assume that the judiciary
would have been expressly exempted from the wide sweep of the section, if
Congress had intended such a result." Id. at 563 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
31. According to Justice Douglas, congressional intent to abolish judicial
immunity was indeed clear in the legislative record because "every member of
Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that the words of the statute meant
what they said and that judges would be liable." Id. at 561. Some commentators have agreed with Justice Douglas. See Note, Stump v. Sparkman: The
Scope of Judicialand Derivative Immunities under 42 U.S.C § 1983, 6 WoMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 107, 114 (1979-1980) (arguing that congressional debate and
the history of the period support the proposition that the Civil Rights Acts
were intended as exceptions to the doctrine of judicial immunity); Note, supra
note 29, at 327-28 (arguing that legislative history indicates that Congress intended § 1983 to include judges).
32. Pierson,386 U.S. at 554-55 ("We do not believe that this settled principle of law was abolished by § 1983, which makes liable 'every person' who
under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights. The legislative
record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all
common-law immunities.").
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The leading modern case on judicial immunity is Stump v.
Sparkman.33 In Stump, the plaintiff sued a state judge under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for approving her sterilization based solely
35
upon her mother's petition.3 In a much-criticized decision,
the Supreme Court employed the two-part Bradley test to determine that judicial immunity shielded the judge from liability.36 The Court held that judicial immunity applied as long as
37
the judge did not act "in clear absence of all jurisdiction" and
33. 435 U.S. 349 (1978). See Blackwell v. Cook, 570 F. Supp. 474, 477 (N.D.
Ind. 1983) (citing Stump as the leading case on judicial immunity). See also
Note, What Constitutesa JudicialAct for Purposes of JudicialImmunity' 53
FORDHAM L. REv. 1503, 1504 (1985) (discussing Stump as the leading modern
case on judicial immunity).
34. Stump, 435 U.S. at 351. The plaintiff's mother had stated in her petition that her 15-year-old daughter was "somewhat retarded" and had on several occasions stayed overnight with young men. Id. She claimed that because
of such behavior and her daughter's limited mental capacity, a tubal ligation
would be in the girl's best interests. Id. The judge approved the petition in an
ex parte proceeding without a hearing and without appointing a guardian to
act on the girl's behalf. Id. at 349. The girl underwent the operation, having
been told that she was to have an appendectomy. Id. at 353. Two years later,
after her marriage, she learned the truth and brought suit. Id.
35. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial
Immunity, 64 VA. L. REV. 833, 858 (1978) (criticizing Stump as a wrongful expansion of judicial immunity and arguing that "correctability on appeal"
should be the "crucial underpinning of absolute judicial immunity"); Note,
supra note 33, at 1503 (identifying both procedural and substantive problems
with the Stump Court's broad and ambiguous test for judicial acts); Note, JudicialImmunity or Imperial Judiciary?,47 UMKC L. REv. 81, 94 (1978) (criticizing as unjustifiable the Stump Court's grant of immunity in the absence of
the possibility of correction on appeal or of other judicial remedies).
36. Stump, 435 U.S. at 364.
37. Id. at 356 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351). This requirement is apparently met in a court of general jurisdiction if there was no statute or case law prohibiting the judge's act. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 358-59 ("But
in our view, it is more significant that there was no Indiana statute and no case
law in 1971 prohibiting a circuit court, a court of general jurisdiction, from
considering a petition of the type presented to Judge Stump." Id. at 358.).
Thus, according to the Court, unless the judge is expressly forbidden to perform a certain function, that function is within the judge's jurisdiction. IdJustice Stewart vigorously dissented from the majority's approach to the
jurisdiction issue in Stump, arguing that it was based on "dangerously broad
criteria." Id. at 367 n.5 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart wrote that
"[a] judge is not free, like a loose cannon, to inflict indiscriminate damage
whenever he announces that he is acting in his judicial capacity." Id. at 367.
Commentators, too, have criticized the Stump approach as providing no real
jurisdictional limitation on courts of general jurisdiction. In her article on judicial immunity, Professor Irene Rosenberg accused the Stump Court of unrealistically expecting Congress to foresee and legislate against all unusual
functions a court may be requested to perform in order to make explicit exceptions to jurisdiction. See Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 835-37 ("The Court's
generous interpretation of subject matter jurisdiction for purposes of immu-
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the act complained of was a "judicial" act. 38
The Court in Stump for the first time articulated what constitutes a judicial act. 39 Adopting a two-pronged test, the Court
held that a judicial act is a "function normally performed by a
judge" when acting "in his judicial capacity." 4 0 Thus, under the
Stump definition of judicial act, judicial immunity depends on
the character of the act, not on the status of the actor as
judge.41 If the act performed by the judge was nonjudicial in
nature, judicial immunity does not apply.42 For example, judicial immunity does not apply to the administrative function of
filing court papers,43 the executive duty of evaluating and
nity requires the legislature to specify the causes of action and types of relief
that are removed from the court's general jurisdiction. To expect state legislatures to make such numerous explicit exceptions is unrealistic." Id. at 837

(footnote omitted).).
38. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356.
39. Id. at 360 (noting that, before Stump, the Court had "not had occasion
to consider, for purposes of the judicial immunity doctrine, the necessary attributes of a judicial act").
40. Id. at 362 ("The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate to the nature of the act
itself, ie., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the
expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.").
41. It has long been the rule that judicial immunity depends on the nature
of the act, not on the status of the actor. For example, in Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339 (1879), the Supreme Court refused to grant a county judge immunity from prosecution for racial discrimination in selecting jurors. Finding
that the selection of jurors was not a judicial act, the Court stated:
Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined
by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he
was a county judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting
jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to
one holding the office of a judge. It is often given to county commissioners, or supervisors, or assessors.... In such cases, it surely is not
a judicial act, in any such sense as it is contended for here. It is
merely a ministerial act ....
That the jurors are selected for a court
makes no difference. So are court criers, tipstaves, sheriffs, etc. Is
their election or their appointment a judicial act?
Id. at 348. See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982) (stating that
"an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be justified by reference to public interest in the special functions of his office, not the fact of high
station").
42. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 656 (7th Cir.) (noting that
"judges are protected only when they are acting as 'judges,' not as administrators"), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1282 (1986).
43. See McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that
court clerk does not enjoy derivative judicial immunity for negligently failing
to file plaintiff's petition for post conviction relief because the act does not require judicial or quasi-judicial discretion).
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the legislative function of
appointing judicial officers, 44 or
45
rules.
disciplinary
promulgating
The question whether employment decisions by a judge
46
constitute judicial acts under the Stump test has led to confu47
Several courts
sion and conflict in the lower federal courts.
44. See Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing
to grant Judicial Selection Commission absolute immunity from suit by state
judge alleging that the Commission's refusal to reappoint him constituted a
deprivation of procedural due process).
45. See Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980)
(holding that the Supreme Court of Virginia was not protected by judicial immunity for banning attorney advertising in violation of attorneys' first and
fourteenth amendment rights; the Virginia court, however, did enjoy legislative immunity for "propounding the Code").
By the same token, judicial immunity may apply to persons other than
judges when those persons perform judicial acts. See, e.g., Denman v. Leedy,
479 F.2d 1097, 1098 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding court clerk immune from liability
for failure to set bail pursuant to statute authorizing the performance of this
judicial function by clerks in misdemeanor cases).
For a discussion of the history of prosecutorial immunity, see McCormack
& Kirkpatrick, Immunities of State Offwials Under Section 1983, 8 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 65, 91-93 (1976) (defining prosecutorial immunity as quasi-judicial); see
also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (holding prosecutors immune
from civil suits under § 1983 for malicious prosecution and noting that the
same considerations underlying judicial immunity also underlie prosecutorial
immunity).
46. Generally, the jurisdiction requirement is not an issue in actions
against judges for their employment decisions, provided the judges were authorized to make employment decisions. See, e.g., McMillan v. Svetanoff, 793
F.2d 149, 151 (7th Cir. 1986) (concluding that in court reporter's civil rights action for discharge on the basis of race and political affiliation, a "jurisdiction
analysis is inappropriate because the discharge decision does not implicate the
power of the court-only the authority of the judge to make such an employment decision"). Some cases involving judges' employment decisions ignore
the jurisdiction issue entirely. See, e.g., Lewis v. Blackburn, 555 F. Supp. 713
(W.D.N.C. 1983) (discussing only the judicial act issue in finding that judge
was not immune for violating plaintiff's first amendment rights by failing to
reappoint plaintiff magistrate); Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526
(S.D. Iowa 1978) (analyzing only the judicial act issue in holding judge liable
for violation of probation officer's first amendment rights through dismissal).
47. Courts have commented on the confusion about whether judges' employment decisions may constitute judicial acts. See Cronovich v. Dunn, 573 F.
Supp. 1340, 1342 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (noting that "there is confusion over the
scope of immunity granted judges in making personnel appointments"); Shore
v. Howard, 414 F. Supp. 379, 386 n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (stating that the issue of
judges' liability for damages for personnel decisions is vague). Some of the
confusion results from the ambiguity of the Stump test for judicial acts, which
has been criticized for its inherent vagueness. See, e.g., Block, supra note 9, at
920 (arguing that the Stump court's inadvertent redefinition of judicial act has
misled courts and has resulted in disarray and dissatisfaction); Note, supra
note 33, at 1504 ("definition of a judicial act for purposes of the second prong
of the Stump test has caused confusion among the lower courts").
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have held that judicial immunity does not apply to the hiring
and firing of court personnel. Although these courts have
reached the same result, the rationales employed often have
been different. One court concluded that the appointment of
magistrates and other judges was a ministerial rather than a judicial function because judicial functions are "primarily acts
necessary in the hearing and decision of cases or controversies."'48 Another court reasoned that a state judge was not entitled to immunity for his discharge of a probation officer
because there was no opportunity for appellate review.49
Other federal courts have been more willing to apply judicial immunity to employment decisions. In Laskowski v.
Mears,5 0 a federal district court in Indiana adopted an approach
to judicial immunity that examined the actual relationship between the parties and concluded that judicial immunity applies
if, as a factual matter, the probation officer's relationship with
the judge implicated the judge's independence. 5 ' In Blackwell
48. See Blackburn, 555 F. Supp. at 723. In Blackburn, a magistrate
brought suit under § 1983 alleging that the defendant-judge's refusal to reappoint her violated her first amendment right to voice complaints about an increased workload. I& at 715. The court found that the judge's action in
refusing to reappoint the magistrate was not a judicial act and, therefore, that
the judge was not immune from suit. Id- at 723. Consequently, the court
granted the plaintiff's request for reappointment and attorney's fees. Id- at
724.
49. See Atckerson, 458 F. Supp. at 535. Atcherson involved a probation officer suing under § 1983 on the ground that her dismissal abridged her first
amendment right to free speech. I&. Although the court held that the judge
was not entitled to absolute immunity because of the lack of appellate review,
it also held that qualified immunity is "contingent upon a showing that the officer acted in good faith." I& at 536.
50. 600 F. Supp. 1568 (N.D. Ind. 1985). In this case, a probation officer
sued under § 1983 alleging his dismissal was based on age, handicap, and political affiliation. Id. at 1568. He sought "reinstatement, compensation for loss of
employment rights and benefits, and liquidated damages for intangible injuries." Id. at 1570.
51. Id at 1574. The Laskowski court held that the facts of each case must
be assessed in light of the policy behind judicial immunity of protecting the
initiative and independence of the judiciary. I& at 1573-74 ("Unless the judge's
relationship with his or her probation officer is something more unusual as a
factual matter, a relationship which implicates the judge's independence, then
there is no argument that the 'nature of the act' of discharge was 'a judicial
act.'" Id. at 1574.). Denying the defendant-judge's motion for summary judgment, the court required further inquiry into the closeness with which the
probation officer and the judge worked. Id. at 1574.
In holding that the facts of each case determine whether judicial immunity applies, the court in Laskowski distinguished its decision from that in
Blackwell v. Cook, 570 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Ind. 1983). Laskowski, 600 F. Supp.
at 1574. In Blackwell the court held that statutory duties of the probation of-
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v. Cook,52 however, another Indiana federal court held that
judges cannot be civilly liable for firing "confidential employees" of the court.5 3 The Blackwell court reasoned that because
such employees are "essential" to the court's decisiomnaking
process,- 55firing them constitutes a judicial act under the Stump
analysis.
II. FORRESTER V. WHITE: DISMISSAL OF A
PROBATION OFFICER AS A JUDICIAL ACT
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Forrester v. White
marked the first time a federal court of appeals found a judge
absolutely immune 56 from a charge alleging dismissal of an employee 57 on the basis of sex discrimination. 58 Using the twoficer, and not the extent to which as a factual matter the employee's relationship with the judge implicates the judge's independent decision making,
determine whether immunity applies. Blackwell 570 F. Supp. at 477-79 ("a
special, confidential relationship exists between a probation officer and a
judge," id, at 479).
52. 570 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Ind. 1983). In Blackwell a probation officer
sued under § 1983 alleging that she was dismissed in violation of her first and
fourteenth amendment rights. She claimed that the basis for her dismissal
was a conversation she held in the privacy of her own home. Id at 476 & n.1.
Discussing judicial immunity if the judge fired a janitor, the court stated:
'While the judge and janitor might personally enjoy a close relationship dating back to childhood, that personal relationship would be distinguishable
from this occupationalrelationship." I& at 479.
53. Id. at 479. See also Pruitt v. Kimbrough, 536 F. Supp. 764, 767-78 (N.D.
Ind. 1982) (stating in dicta that judges may not be held liable for firing confidential employees on political grounds and characterizing as confidential employees court secretaries, bailiffs, and probation officers).
The Blackcwell court did not examine the particular relationship between
the plaintiff and the judge, but instead considered the duties and responsibilities of probation officers in general. Blackwell 570 F. Supp. at 477. To determine the nature of these duties and responsibilities, the court reviewed the
Indiana statute describing the functions of a probation officer. Id at 477-79.
54. 570 F. Supp. at at 478.
55. Id. The court therefore granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Id at 482.
56. For a discussion of the development of the doctrine of judicial immunity, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
58. 792 F.2d at 657-58. Although other circuit courts have touched on related issues, none has squarely faced the issue whether judges have absolute
immunity for their personnel decisions. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Circuit Court,
729 F.2d 541, 546-47 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff was properly
awarded damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because defense of good faith immunity was unavailable to state judge who transferred a hearing officer because
of her sex); Gabe v. County of Clark, 701 F.2d 102, 103-04 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that judge's secretary was entitled to damages for discharge without written notice and a hearing because she was given no notice of the change of
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part Bradley test for judicial immunity, 59 the Forrestercourt
first considered whether Judge White acted within his jurisdiction in firing Forrester,60 and second, whether Forrester's dismissal constituted a judicial act. 61 After deciding both issues
affirmatively, the Forrester court held that Judge White was
absolutely immune from liability notwithstanding the possibil62
ity that the dismissal was discriminatory.

Addressing the first part of the two-part immunity test, the
Forrester court easily determined that Judge White acted
within his jurisdiction in firing Forrester.63 Restating the question as whether Judge White was "authorized" to dismiss Forrester,64 the court concluded that Forrester's dismissal fell
within Judge White's authority because Illinois law provides
that only judges may fire probation officers. 65 The court thus
concluded that the jurisdiction requirement was met.6 6
To determine whether a judicial act was at issue, the court
adopted the Stump tw9-pronged definition of judicial act:67 a
termination procedures for judges' secretaries); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297,
304-05 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding judge absolutely immune from liability for alleged failure to appoint a sufficient number of court reporters, which plaintiffs
claimed resulted in excessive delay in preparing trial records for appeal); Abbott v. Thetford, 534 F.2d 1101, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding dismissal of
probation officer's claim that his discharge was in violation of his first amendment rights because effective operation of a court requires some regulation of
confidential employees' freedom of speech).
59. For a discussion of the Bradley test for judicial immunity, see supra
notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
60. Forrester,792 F.2d at 655-56.
61. Id. at 656. The Forrestercourt acknowledged the confused and uncertain state of the law concerning whether personnel decisions are judicial acts
meriting immunity. Id. at 653-54. Such uncertainty, according to the court,
was generated because actions against judges by former employees depart
from the paradigm of Bradley and its progeny, in which dissatisfied litigants
sue judges. Id, Immunity was nonetheless equally important, the court decided, because modern judges rely more on their staff for advice on substantive decisions than judges did in the past. The rights of litigants, therefore,
may be affected by this extended "institutional personality." Id. at 654.
62. Id. at 658. For the purpose of considering the propriety of the district
court's decision on judicial immunity, the Seventh Circuit assumed that Judge
White dismissed Forrester because of her sex. Id at 650.
63. Id, at 655-56. The court conceded that the question whether the act
was within the judge's subject matter jurisdiction made little sense in the context of a personnel decision. Id. at 655. The court stated that the jurisdiction
requirement nonetheless had relevance because it was subsumed by the question of the judge's scope of authority. Id at 655-56.
64. Id. at 656.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id
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function normally performed by a judge when acting in her judicial capacity. 68 In deciding that Judge White's dismissal of
Forrester was a function normally performed by a judge, the
Forrestercourt again relied on the fact that under Illinois law
only judges may dismiss probation officers. 69 When he fired
Forrester, Judge White thus performed a normal judicial
function.70
The Forrestercourt found the second prong of the Stump
judicial act test more troublesome.71 Recognizing that judges
often perform functions outside their judicial capacity that do
not merit immunity,72 the Seventh Circuit concluded that to
analyze properly whether the defendant was acting in his judicial capacity, it should focus on the principles underlying immunity. 73 The court thus rephrased the question of judicial
capacity in terms of whether the judge's employment decision
involved the policies 74 and safeguards 75 that justify a grant of
immunity.76
The Forrestercourt considered the judicial immunity issue
78
7
in a context unlike that found in either Bradley 7 or Stump.
In those cases, the Supreme Court considered the judicial im68. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
69. Forrester,792 F.2d at 656. The Forrestercourt was not the first court
to use the same reasoning under both the jurisdiction part of the judicial immunity test and the normally-performed-function portion of the test. The
Stump Court itself, in trying to define "judicial act," confused the normallyperformed-function analysis with that of jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 362 n.11 (1978) (observing that the judge's act was a judicial act
because it fell within the judge's jurisdictional grant). Professor Rosenberg
has criticized this merging of analytical techniques and the resulting destruction of any distinction between the two separate elements of the judicial immunity test. Rosenberg contends that use of a jurisdiction test to define
judicial act could immunize judges from the consequences of deviant behavior
in situations in which they possess jurisdiction. See Rosenberg, supra note 35,
at 844-45.
70. Forrester,792 F.2d at 656.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 656-57. The court noted, for example, that judges do not enjoy
immunity for their administrative acts. Id. at 656-57 & n.10.
73. Id. at 656-57.
74. Id at 658. For a discussion of the policies underlying judicial immunity, see supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
75. Id. For a discussion of the safeguards justifying judicial immunity, see
supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
76. Id. at 657-58.
77. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). For a discussion of
Bradley, see supra notes 9-23 and accompanying text.
78. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). For a discussion of Stump,
see supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
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munity question in a trial context and was concerned with the
potential for vexatious suits brought against judges by disgruntled litigants. 79 The Forrester court, however, was concerned
with the possibility that a judge who has lost confidence in his
probation officer may nevertheless hesitate to fire the officer
for fear of civil suit.8 0 According to the court, if the probation
officer is in a position to affect the judge's discretionary judgment, the fear of a civil damages action could undermine the
policy of preserving independent judicial decision making."'
In Forrester,the plaintiff was responsible for providing advice and information to the judge concerning sentencing, probation, and revocation of parole and probation.8 2 On the basis of
these duties, the court determined that Forrester's relationship
with the judge was both confidential and influential.8 3 Immunity should attach to a judge's decisions concerning such confidential positions, the Forrestercourt concluded, to prevent the
impairment of the judge's decisionmaking ability.8 4 Forcing a
judge to rely on a probation officer the judge no longer trusted
would make the parties appearing before the court victims of
unprincipled decision making.8 5 In light of the policy of preserving independent decision making, the court thus held that
Judge White was acting within his judicial capacity when he
86
fired Forrester.
In addition to this traditional policy concern, the court
contended that immunity was necessary to protect judges from
suits that might be brought by litigants who have learned of the
decline of the judge's relationship with her probation officer.8 7
79. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 363-64; Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 349. For a
discussion of the dangers of judges' amenability to suit by dissatisfied litigants,
see supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.

80.

Forrester,792 F.2d at 658. The Forrestercourt stated:

The evil to be avoided is the following- A judge loses confidence in
his probation officer, but hesitates to fire him because of the threat of
litigation. He then retains the officer, in which case the parties appearing before the court are the victims, because the quality of the
judge's decision-making will decline.

Id.
81. Id. at 657-58.
82. Id. at 657.
83. I&
84. Id at 657-58.
85. Id. at 658.
86. Id. Essentially, the Forrestercourt held that if the plaintiff's performance of her job responsibilities influenced the decisions that traditionally are
considered judicial acts, the dismissal of the plaintiff was itself a judicial act.
See id, at 657-58.
87. Id. at 658. The court did not explain, however, why immunity would
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Otherwise, the judge could be charged with impropriety and
lose the respect necessary to effectively perform her duties.8 8
The Forrestercourt also noted that safeguards such as impeachment, censure, equitable and declaratory relief, and market
forces reduce the need for a private damages action.8 9 Finally,
the court asserted broadly that without immunity for employment decisions, judges would be forced to employ wasteful and
meticulous self-protective devices. 90
Although presented with the opportunity, the Seventh Circuit in Forresterrefused to establish a general rule concerning
judges' liability for personnel decisions. 91 Instead, the court
stated narrowly that judicial immunity depends upon the nature of the particular relationship between the judge and staff
member 92 and whether granting judicial immunity would advance the policies underlying the doctrine.93 Under this rule,
judicial immunity would not apply where the interaction between the judge and employee does not implicate the judge's
decision making.94 The court thus declined to express an opinion on the personnel decisions Judge White made involving
other members of his staff, or on employment decisions
concerning probation officers in different court systems. 95
not attach when a litigant brought suit against a judge upon discovering the
deterioration of the judge's professional relationship with her probation
officer.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id at 657. Compare Forrester,792 F.2d at 657 (refusing to set a general rule concerning judges' liability for firing employees "because the interaction between the judge and the members of his staff does not always
appropriately implicate the decisions of the judge qua judge") with Lewis v.
Blackburn, 555 F. Supp. 713, 723 (W.D.N. C. 1983) (holding that the immunity
defense is never available for judges' personnel appointments because such decisions are ministerial duties (discussed supranote 48 and accompanying text))
and Blackwell v. Cook, 570 F. Supp. 474, 477-79 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (holding that
judges are immune from civil damage actions by fired probation officers (discussed supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text)).
92. Forrester,792 F.2d at 657. The court observed that because each judge
may interact differently with staff members and each system may allocate responsibility to employees differently, it was impossible to establish a general
rule. -1d.
93. Id. at 657-58.
94. See id. at 658.
95. See id. The court emphasized the factual nature of the inquiry by
writing: "We have, as we must, addressed only the facts of the case before us."
Hd
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III. THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE JUDICIAL
IMMJNITY DOCTRINE IN FORRESTER
The Forrester court asserted that policy considerations
should be the touchstone for analyzing judicial conduct under
the Stump judicial act test.96 In examining the policies behind
judicial immunity, however, the court developed a new line of
reasoning that altered the traditional emphasis in judicial immunity cases and too quickly dismissed factors that have previously played an important role in deciding this issue.
Courts considering the issue of judicial immunity have accepted the proposition that, without immunity, judges, by the
nature of their role in dispute resolution, would be particularly
vulnerable to lawsuits by dissatisfied litigants. 97 Losing parties,
dissatisfied with their result, would attempt to continue their
case by suing the judges involved for alleged civil rights violations.98 This type of litigation would result not only in costs to
the defendant judges, but would also increase the expense of
litigation generally, divert judges' energy from judicial issues,
and deter acceptance of judicial office. 99
In Forrester,however, there was no showing that judges
are more likely to be sued by employees than are other public
employers who are not entitled to immunity for alleged employment discrimination. 00 It follows, then, that the social
costs of denying judges immunity for their discriminatory acts
do not exceed the costs incurred in holding other public employers liable for such conduct. Nonetheless, the Forrester
96. For a discussion of the Stump test, see supranotes 39-45 and accompanying text.
97. Judge Posner, dissenting in Forrester,noted that a judge for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals votes in more than 200 cases each year. Forrester, 792 F.2d at 661 (Posner, J., dissenting). A significant fraction of the
losers of those cases, claimed Judge Posner, would sue the judges as a means
of collaterally attacking adverse decisions. Id. Because most such suits would
be frivolous and wasteful, Judge Posner agreed that judicial immunity is justified when litigants sue judges. Id
98. The Court in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), explained:
As the Bradley court suggested ... controversies sufficiently intense
to erupt in litigation are not easily capped by a judicial decree. The
loser in one forum will frequently seek another, charging the participants in the first with unconstitutional animus....

Absolute immu-

nity is thus necessary to assure that judges... can perform their...
functions without harassment or intimidation.

Id. at 512.
99. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).

100. See Forrester,792 F.2d at 662 (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that a
"judge is no more likely to be sued for employment discrimination than any
other employer, public or private").
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court denied judicial employees a right of action against their
employers.
The Forrester court justified its decision to grant judicial
immunity by asserting the policy of promoting independent judicial decision making.10 As noted above, 10 2 however, the Forrester court departed from the traditional reasoning that judges
must be granted absolute immunity because, without immunity,
the threat of personal liability for judicial decisions could result
in inconsistent and unprincipled decision making.10 3 Instead,
the Forrestercourt was concerned that the decisionmaking process would be distorted if judges retained incompetent employees out of a fear of civil litigation because they would then be
they considered to be untrustworthy in disrelying on advice
04
posing of cases.'
The Forrester court's reasoning, however, strains the
judicial immunity analysis employed by courts since Bradley
and establishes an entirely new rationale for the immunity defense. The approach adopted by the Forrestercourt, that the
threat of liability for employment discrimination hampers a
judge's ability to maintain a competent and trustworthy staff,
not only misconstrues the policy of preserving principled and
101. Id at 657-58.
102. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
103. See Forrester,792 F.2d at 654.
Although the reasoning that the goal of principled decision making justifies immunity has been widely accepted, see, e.g., Forrester,792 F.2d at 661-62
(Posner, J., dissenting) (judicial immunity is justified when the threat of massive litigation would be likely to distort a judge's official behavior and result in
serious detriment to the public), it is not without its critics. Justice Douglas,
dissenting in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 565-66 (1967), argued that judicial
immunity is not necessary to preserve an independent judiciary. He quoted
Chief Justice Cockburn who, dissenting in an English judicial immunity case,
wrote:
"I cannot believe that judges ... would fail to discharge their duty
faithfully and fearlessly according to their oaths and consciences...
from any fear of exposing themselves to actions at law. I am persuaded that the number of such actions would be infinitely small and
would be easily disposed of. While, on the other hand, I can easily
conceive cases in which judicial opportunity might be so perverted
and abused for the purpose of injustice as that, on sound principles,
the authors of such wrong ought to be responsible to the parties
wronged."
I& (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, 5 L.J.Q.B. 94,
110 (1869) (Cockburn, C.J., dissenting)). See also Note, supra note 29, at 331
("Any argument that the pressure of liability would encourage unprincipledread 'wrong' apparently-decisions must presume a general weakness in judicial fiber. It does not logically follow that principle automatically flees from a
fear of law-suits [sic].").
104. See Forrester,792 F.2d at 658.
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independent decision making but also departs from the functional approach toward judicial immunity clearly required by
105
the Stump test.
Under Stump, judges are immune only for their judicial
acts. 0 6 The Forrestercourt, however, in holding the dismissal
of a probation officer to be a judicial act, failed to explain why
such an act functionally merits immunity. There is no showing
in Forrester that judges, in performing such a function, differ
from other similarly situated employers. Certainly, prosecutors, public defenders, and private attorneys play as important a
role in the outcome of cases as do probation officers. Yet the
employers of such persons are not granted absolute immunity
in suits alleging employment discrimination. In addition, the
reasoning of Forrester is not logically limited to judicial employment decisions. The rationale of ensuring competent personnel extends to every government official who relies on
subordinates in performing discretionary functions. 107 Thus,
Judge White was granted immunity because of his status as
judge, not because, functionally, his role as employer, as opposed to the roles of other employers, required the sacrifice of
individuals' rights of action for the public good. 08
In addition to misapplying the functional policy test for judicial immunity, the Forrester court also overemphasized the
role that procedural safeguards would play in deterring judicial
105. For a discussion of the Stump principle that immunity is dependent
on the nature of the act, not the status of the actor, see supra notes 39-45 and
accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 41-45.
107. See Forrester,792 F.2d at 659 (Posner, J., dissenting).
108. The Forrestercourt's reliance on the policy of avoiding judicial dependence on wasteful devices to protect against later suit also supports the reading that the court did not follow a functional approach to judicial immunity.
See id. at 658. The policy of avoiding judicial reliance on wasteful self-protective devices was one of the Bradley Court's considerations. See Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 349 (1872). In Bradley, the Court stated the policy in terms of meticulous recordkeeping. The policy of avoiding meticulous
recordkeeping developed as a practical response to the possibility of judges being harassed by suits by former litigants. Forrester,792 F.2d at 652 (citing
Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347-54). Certainly a judge hearing hundreds of
cases a year might be driven to wasteful recordkeeping if she feared that any
one of those cases could result in personal liability. A judge merely maintaining a staff, however, would be no more likely than any other public employer
to keep records so meticulous as to seriously interfere with public duties. In
light of the failure in Forresterto show that judges are particularly vulnerable
to suit for employment decisions, the court's reliance on the recordkeeping
policy was misplaced.
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misconduct involving employment decisions.10 9 The safeguards
cited by the court simply are inadequate to prevent impermissible employment discrimination. The threat of judicial impeachment or censure is too remote to be seriously viewed as a
deterrent to such discriminatory conduct. Assuming that the
victims of employment discrimination could muster enough
strength and support to even raise the issue, the impeachment
and censure of judges are extreme measures that rarely are
carried out 1 0 The court's claim that market forces could effectively deter discrimination in judicial employment is also difficult to understand in light of the fact that those forces have
been inadequate in deterring discrimination in other areas of
public employment.1 1 In addition, equitable relief would operate as a deterrent to such discriminatory conduct only when the
iplaintiffs§ complaint could be satisfied with backpay and reinstatement to the court in which she had suffered the
discrimination.
Besides relying on these ineffective safeguards to find
Judge White immune, the Forrestercourt also ignored the fact
that other safeguards traditionally considered important to a judicial immunity analysis were lacking in this case. As explained in Butz v. Economou,1' a judge's insulation from
political influences, the importance of precedent in resolving
conflicts, and the adversary nature of the judicial process reduce the need for private actions to deter unconstitutional conduct. 113 In Forrester, however, the court failed to recognize
that even judges insulated from political influences are free to
discriminate on such impermissible bases as race or sex, and
that precedent does not operate as a safeguard against employ109. See supra text accompanying note 89.
110. See Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 857 (arguing that the threat of criminal or disciplinary proceedings against judges is too remote to deter lawless

judges because district attorneys would be unwilling to prosecute judges for
nonmonetary misconduct and judicial qualifications commissions are less than
zealous in prosecuting malfeasants); Note, Judicial Immunity and Judicial
Misconduct A Proposalfor Limited Liability, 20 ARiZ. L. REv. 549, 564-65 &
nn.13-14 (1978) (providing statistics on the infrequency of impeachment proceedings initiated against judges and citing a study which revealed that before
1960 only 50 impeachment proceedings were brought in the United States and
only 19 judges were removed).
111. The enactment of title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which provides a
cause of action against public employers for some types of discrimination, evidences the ineffectiveness of market forces as a deterrent to employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
112. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
113. For a discussion of Butz, see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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ment discrimination because judges cannot cite authority for
firing an employee in the same way they can cite cases supporting their rulings in court. Moreover, no adversarial process is
involved in a dismissal and, therefore, there is no assurance
that all facts are disclosed and that the employee's interests are
vigorously promoted. Thus, unlike the situation involved in the
adjudication of disputes, in the employment context there is no
significant systemic check on judicial misconduct.
Additionally, there is no opportunity for a victim of employment discrimination to seek a remedy for a judicial wrong
except by commencing a civil suit.114 Since Bradley, courts

have justified the denial of private damages actions when parties had the opportunity to seek correction of a judicial wrong
through appeal. 115 Although the Stump decision departed from
precedent by granting immunity even though the plaintiff had
no opportunity for appeal, that decision was made in the face of
114. Victims of employment discrimination by judges may seek a remedy
only by bringing suit. They may, as did Forrester, bring an action against the
judge under § 1983 for violation of a constitutional right. The judge might,
however, be found immune from liability.
The victims may also bring an action against the employing agency under
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
The possibility of relief under title VII, however, does not justify granting
absolute judicial immunity for employment decisions. Relief under title VII is
limited to the equitable relief of backpay and reinstatement. Forrester,792
F.2d at 662 (Posner, J., dissenting). It does not provide for common-law damages. Id More important, however, title VII is available only for certain constitutional violations. It does not cover, for example, employment
discrimination in violation of first amendment rights. A party whose first
amendment rights have been violated is therefore limited to action against the
judge. If the judge is immune from liability, that party has no remedy available. That Congress has provided a remedy for some forms of employment
discrimination does not justify making judges immune from liability for all
forms.
115. See, e.g., Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (citing "the correctability of error on appeal" as one of the checks on malicious action by judges); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 554 (1967) ("[A judge's] errors may be corrected on appeal, but he
should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption."); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335,
345 (1872) (private parties must resort to the numerous remedies the law has
provided to protect themselves against the consequences of improper judicial
action); Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526, 535 (S.D. Iowa 1978) (absolute immunity extends only to judicial actions, and the availability of appellate
review is a relevant factor in determining whether an act is judicial).
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vehement dissent11 6 and has sparked strong criticism by commentators."1 7 The Forrestercourt would have done well to return to the traditional, and less-criticized, analysis that required
for appellate review before granting absolute
an opportunity
18
immunity.

Nonetheless, even if the policies and safeguards discussed
by the Forrester court justified the grant of immunity, the
court's requirement of a factual inquiry into the judge-employee relationship1 1 9 undermines the court's intentions in
granting immunity. Summary disposition of actions against
judges is necessary to prevent vexatious suits and to further the
policies of immunity. Summary judgment, however, is appropriate only when there is no issue of material fact and the mov20
Under
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

116. In his dissent in Stump, Justice Powell argued that the judicial immunity defense should not be allowed where a judge has cut -off all avenues of
appeal. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 369-70 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting). He contended that Bradley sacrificed private rights to the public good on
the assumption that alternative forums existed for the vindication of those
rights. Id Therefore, when the possibility of vindication of a plaintiff's rights
has been absolutely precluded, the judge should not be immune from liability.
Id. Justice Stewart likewise dissented in Stump because none of the normal
attributes of a judicial proceeding, including the possibility of appeal, were
present in the case. Id. at 368-69 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
117. See Feinman & Cohen, supra note 9, at 280 (stating that Stump should
have been decided the other way in view of the high value of human dignity
and the redress of wrongful injury); Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 858 (concluding that, although judges' desire for an overbroad umbrella of judicial immunity is understandable, it is outrageous to "stretch that umbrella so that it also
covers Daumier caricatures in judicial robes on their way to a masquerade
ball").
One commentator who espouses a more limited immunity for judges has
criticized the use of appellate review as a justification for absolute immunity.
The commentator argues that appellate review is a weak deterrent of unconstitutional conduct and is an inadequate remedy both because of its costliness
and because it cannot give compensation. It can only result in a reversal or
new trial. See Note, supra note 110, at 565-66.
118. See, e.g., Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (using traditional analysis to determine that judge enjoys absolute immunity from liability for alleged § 1983
violations).
119. For a discussion of the Forrestercourt's emphasis on the factual nature of the judge-employee relationship, see supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 which reads in part:
The judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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the Forresteranalysis, therefore, it would be inappropriate to
grant summary judgment if the plaintiff-employee has pleaded
that as a factual matter her relationship with the judge did not
implicate the judge's discretionary decision making and if the
plaintiff-employee is able to create a genuine issue of fact concerning her ability to influence the judge's rulings. Although
the Forrester decision upheld summary judgment against the
plaintiff, future plaintiffs now know the issue they need to create to survive summary judgment motions. Thus, if courts
adopt this factual approach, judges may still be burdened with
defending themselves at trial and the resulting harm to the
public will be no less present.
The factual inquiry advocated in Forresteralso fails to provide specific guidelines for judges to follow in hiring and firing
their employees.12 1 Under Forrester,whether immunity will be
granted will vary from court to court and from employee to
employee due to differences in factual situations. The liability
question could become especially muddled if, as the Forrester
court suggested, modern judicial staffmembers play a larger
role in substantive decision making.12 2 If liability depends on a
staffmember's remoteness from the judicial decisionmaking
process, differing degrees of remoteness could lead to confusing
results. Because no clear rule exists to guide them, judges
making personnel decisions are unlikely to rely on the possibility that they may possess absolute immunity.1 2 3 If immunity
121. The only firm guideline suggested by the court is that immunity will
not attach to a decision to not hire a janitor because "[a] janitor is not required
to provide a judge with advice and information concerning pending cases."

Forrester,792 F.2d at 656.
122. See i&1 at 654.
The threat that the Forresterholding will muddle the question of liability

is borne out by a recent decision of the Montana Supreme Court. Citing Forrester, the Montana Court held a judge immune from an unfair termination
action brought by his secretary. Mead v. McKittrick 727 P.2d 517, 519 (Mont.
1986). The court concluded that because judicial efficiency depends in part
upon a professional and confidential judge-secretary relationship, the act of

firing a secretary is a judicial act. Id Thus, even though a secretary plays no

role in influencing judicial decisionmaking, in Montana the secretary may not
bring a wrongful discharge suit against the employer-judge. It is therefore

open to question what other judicial employees not involved in decisionmaking
will receive similar treatment under interpretations of Forrester.
123. Dissenting in Forrester,Judge Posner wrote:
The absolute immunity for a judge's legal rulings is about as definite a
rule as we have in our legal system, and the absolute immunity that
the court creates today is about as indefinite, which robs the principle
of its value to the judges and to the public. Absolute immunity provides real security only if the scope of the immunity is well defined.
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has but little effect on a judge's personnel decisions, it is of
value only to an errant judge, not to the public.
Finally, the court's decision in Forresterengenders inconsistency between judicial immunity for hiring decisions and for
firing decisions. Logically, there is no reason why judges
should enjoy immunity for a discriminatory firing if they are
124
not immune from making hiring decisions on the same basis.
It would be impossible, however, to undertake a factual inquiry
into the judge-employee relationship if the judge had not yet
hired the employee or established any type of relationship.
Yet, under Forrester,if the judge cannot prove that the plaintiff
implicated judicial decision making, judicial immunity will not
apply. To avoid this inconsistency, the Forrester court should
have laid down a2 5general no-immunity rule for judges' employment decisions.CONCLUSION
Courts have traditionally granted judicial immunity for
Under the court's approach the process of definition will be protracted and may never yield a clear rule on which employees or job
applicants may sue which judges and which may not, and for what.
We shall still have to buy liability insurance.
Forrester,792 F.2d at 664 (Posner, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 659 (Posner, J., dissenting) ("It would be a curious notion that a
judge must hire probation officers without regard to their race or sex but is
free to fire them on the basis of their race or sex.").
125. One alternative to absolute judicial immunity for certain employment
decisions would have been to grant judges qualified immunity which protects
judges who show that their discriminatory act was unintentional and was done
in good faith. Cf. Rodriguez v. Board of Educ., 620 F.2d 362, 366-67 (2d Cir.
1980) (holding that good faith is a defense for school officials against liability
for damages in an action for deliberate sex discrimination under § 1983). Good
faith immunity, however, requires that the defendant's conduct not violate
clearly established constitutional or statutory rights, of which a reasonable
person should have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
This good faith defense in employment cases, therefore, would assume that
judges can reasonably be unaware that sex discrimination in employment is
unconstitutional. As explained by the Ninth Circuit, such an assumption
should not be tolerated: "Mhe constitutional right to be free from such invidious discrimination is so well established and so essential to the preservation of
our constitutional order that all public officials must be charged with knowledge of it." Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1392 (9th Cir.) (citing Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), and holding that there is no good faith immunity for
city officials who delay granting of liquor license on grounds of national origin), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980). See also Goodwin v. Circuit Court, 729
F.2d 541, 545-46 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that defense of good faith immunity is
unavailable to circuit court judge who demoted hearing officer on the basis of
her sex). Qualified immunity, therefore, should have no place in § 1983 actions
against judges for impermissible discrimination in employment.
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acts relevant to the adjudication of cases. The Forrestercourt,
however, granted judicial immunity for a discriminatory personnel decision made by a judge. In so doing, the court misconstrued the policy considerations underlying judicial immunity
and ignored the fact that the safeguards traditionally relied on
by courts to protect individuals from judicial misconduct are ineffective in the context of personnel decisions. A product of
the court's fact-oriented approach, the holding in Forresternot
only prevents certain judicial employees from seeking damages
for discrimination, it also leaves judges without clear guidelines
as to which employees are involved in the grant of immunity.
Courts, therefore, should deny immunity for judges' personnel
decisions and thereby strike a more equitable balance between
public and individual needs.
Tracy M. Smith

